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TAXATION OF PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS:
ADDRESSING THE MIND/BODY DUALISM THAT
PLAGUES § 104(A)(2) OF THE TAX CODE
G. Christopher Wright+
The National Taxpayer Advocate's 2009 Annual Report to Congress stated
that taxation of personal injury awards-specifically whether Internal Revenue
Code (Tax Code) § 104(a)(2) excludes compensatory-damage awards in
personal injury cases from gross income-is one of the most litigated issues in
federal courts for a fifth consecutive year.I Section 104(a)(2) excludes
compensatory dama es from personal injuries or sicknesses that are "physical"
from gross income. Further, for purposes of the physical-injury or sickness
exclusion, emotional distress is not considered "physical." Because the
statute, regulations, and courts do not define the terms "physical" and
"emotional distress,"4 taxpayers are often confused about whether their
personal injury damages stem from physical injuries or sicknesses and are thus
excluded from gross income.5  This lack of clarity creates predictability
problems for taxpayers; taxpayers should be able to self-assess their tax
liabilities with certainty.6
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.S., 1992, East Carolina University. The author wishes to thank Professor Regina Jefferson for
her help and guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review staff members for their dedication
to this Comment. He also wishes to thank his wife and two children for their unwavering love
and support throughout this endeavor.
1. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 446 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/3_09_tas-arc-vo
lI _mli.pdf; see also NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 472
n.20 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article
/0,,id=202276,00.html ("Taxation of damage awards spurs litigation every year.").
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
3. Id. § 104(a).
4. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000); see also 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 447 ("It is clear from ... cases we reviewed that many questions remain as to how
'physical' is to be defined under IRC § 104(a)(2).").
5. 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 474; see also NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,
2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 584 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT], available
at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=177301,00.html ("Although the legislative history is
quite clear, the relationship between mind and body and the biological and neurological basis of
mental problems, is not always as clear.").
6. See, e.g., Lynch v. Comm'r, 801 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986) (criticizing the tax
court's interpretation of the law because it "undermines the ability of taxpayers to . . . know the
tax consequences with certainty").
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Section 104(a)(2) is one of several sections in the Tax Code under the
heading "Items specifically excluded from gross income."7 Taxpayers
determine federal income tax owed by multiplying a tax rate by taxable
income.8  Taxpayers determine taxable income by first calculating gross
income.9  Gross income is "all income from whatever source derived,"
including damages received from lawsuits.1o However, if a taxpayer
demonstrates that a damage award falls within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, the
award is excluded from gross income and escapes federal income taxation.
Until 1996, the text of § 104(a)(2) was largely unchanged from the time of
its original enactment. 12 Before 1996, the statute excluded damages received
on account of personal injury or sickness from gross income; there was no
requirement that the injury or sickness be physical. 13 In the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996,14 Congress amended the statute by inserting the
word "physical" before injury and sickness15 and excluded emotional distress
from the definition of physical injury or sickness.16
7. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (located in Tit. 26, subtit. A, ch. 1, subch. B, pt. Ill).
8. Id. §1.
9. Id § 63(a).
10. Id §61(a).
I1. Id § 104(a)(2). Without this exclusion, for example, a taxpayer who receives a
$100,000 personal injury award would have to include this amount in taxable income. Assuming
a marginal tax rate of twenty-eight percent, the taxpayer's award would effectively be reduced by
$28,000.
12. Compare Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066
(1919) (enacting the original form of the present day statute), with I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994)
(containing nearly identical language).
13. 1.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
14. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a), 110 Stat.
1755, 1838.
15. § 1605(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 1838.
16. § 1605(b), 110 Stat. at 1838. Congress added the "physical" and "emotional distress"
language in an attempt to clarify § 104(a)(2). See H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143 (1996) (Conf.
Rep.). Congress's specific reason for changing § 104(a)(2) in 1996 was that the "confusion as to
the tax treatment of damages received in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness
has led to substantial litigation." Id; see also Venable v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254, 259
(2003) ("Legislative history ... reveals that the change was intended [to] . . . reduce or eliminate
ambiguity . . . ."), aff'd, I 10 F. App'x 421 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite its attempt to reduce
litigation, confusion and litigation continued; taxpayers are just as confused today by the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion as they were prior to the 1996 amendment. See 2008 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 474-75 ("The increase in cases litigating the issue of damage awards could
suggest that Murphy v. Commissioner, discussed in detail in the 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports to
Congress, did not help to resolve the confusion surrounding the treatment of settlement and
damage awards."); see also Susan A. Berson, The Taxation of Tort Damage Awards and
Settlements: When Recovering More for a Client May Result in Less, 78 J. KAN. B.A. 21,
22 (2009) ("Confusion often surrounds how the tax code treats compensation for emotional
distress. This is because emotional distress is not technically considered a physical injury or
physical sickness."); Robert W. Wood, Bruises, Settlements, and the Proposed 104 Regs, 124
212 [Vol. 60:21 1
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The case of Charles Allen, a train operator involved in an accident in
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan further illustrates the issue.18 Allen was operating
a train while a city-operated school bus attempted to maneuver through
lowered gates at a railroad crossing.19 Unable to stop the train in time, Allen
plowed into the school bus at sixty-five miles per hour.20 He did not suffer a
single bruise, cut, or broken bone; however, a Positron Emission Topography
(PET)21 scan revealed abnormalities in his brain that suggested that he suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).22
Allen filed suit against the Bloomfield Hills School District, but the trial
court dismissed the suit, concluding that he "did not suffer a 'bodily injury' as
23 24required by the statute. The court of appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that "as a matter of medicine and law, there should be no difference
medically or legally between an objectively demonstrated brain injury, whether
the medical diagnosis is ... PTSD, Alzheimer's, brain tumor, epilepsy, etc. A
brain injury is a 'bodily injury."' 25
TAX NOTES 1337, 1342 (2009) ("Thirteen years after section 104 was amended, confusion is still
rampant.").
17. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008),
appeal dismissed, 779 N.W.2d 293 (2010).
18. Id.
19. Id
20. Id. Fortunately, there were no children on board, but the driver of the bus was critically
injured. Id.
21. According to the Mayo Clinic, "[a] PET scan ... is an imaging test that can help reveal
how your tissues and organs are functioning." MAYO CLINIC STAFF, POSITRON EMISSION
TOMOGRAPHY (PET) SCAN, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pet-scan/MY00238 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2010).
22. Allen, 760 N.W.2d at 815. Indeed, the doctors noted that the PET scan revealed
"decreases in frontal and subcortical activity consistent with . .. post traumatic stress disorder and
that the abnormalities in . . . Allen's brain as depicted on the . . . PET scan are quite pronounced."
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 812 (internal citations omitted); see id. at 813 ("[T]he broad immunity afforded [to
a governmental agency] by the statute is limited by several narrowly drawn exceptions . . . [and
o]ne of these exceptions ... [is] for bodily injury .... ) (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 817. The court of appeals noted that the statute did not define the term "bodily
injury." Id. at 814. For guidance, the court looked at the definition of "bodily injury" in Random
House Webster's College Dictionay and Black's Law Dictionary. Id at 815. The court noted
that Webster's "defines 'bodily' as 'of or pertaining to the body ... as contrasted with spiritual or
mental.' . . . Black's Law Dictionary . . . also defines 'bodily injury' as '[p]hysical damage to a
person's body."' Id (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999)); RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001); cf I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000)
(referring to Black's Law Dictionary to define the term "personal physical injuries" because the
term is not defined in § 104(a)(2)).
25. Allen, 760 N.W.2d at 816. The majority then rejected the dissent's assertion that
"because all thoughts and emotions are connected to brain activity, accepting plaintiffs injury as
a 'bodily injury' would require completely breaking down the barrier between emotional and
physical harms." Id. A state court's definition of "bodily injury" is not controlling for purposes
2010] 213
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Allen still must receive a damage award from the school district.26 But
assuming he eventually receives an award, will his award be excluded from
gross income under the § 104(a)(2) exclusion for personal physical injury and
escape federal income taxation?2  To be excluded, Allen must show that
PTSD is a physical injury or sickness, not simply a form of emotional
distress.28
This Comment provides courts with a definition of and a distinction between
physical injury or sickness and emotional distress that comports with the
language and intent of the statute in the continued absence of promulgated
regulations interpreting § 104(a)(2). 29 It will also help resolve the confusing
question that taxpayers like Charles Allen face: whether a personal injury
award is compensation for a physical injury or sickness or for emotional
distress. It concludes by analyzing current interpretations of § 104(a)(2) to
determine whether brain-based illnesses, such as major chronic depression and
of § 104(a)(2), a federal statute. See U.S. Nat'l Bank of Portland v. United States, 188 F. Supp.
332, 337 (D. Or. 1960).
26. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 764 N.W.2d 576, 576 (Mich. 2009) (recording
the school district's appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan to determine whether PTSD
qualifies as a bodily injury.)
27. Some commentators have suggested that the award would be taxable. See, e.g.,
Margarita R. Karpov, Note, To Tax or Not to Tax-That Is the Question in the Midst of Murphy v.
I.R.S., 23 AKRON TAX J. 143, 178 (2008) (concluding under a hypothetical that awards based on
PTSD would be taxable). Under this view, PTSD and depression are not physical sicknesses;
rather, PTSD and depression symptoms like "insomnia, headaches, [and] stomach disorders" are
included in "emotional distress." See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
On the other hand, Robert Wood suggests that the answer is not so obvious. See Robert W.
Wood, What's Excludable? Despite Amendment, IRC Sec. 104 Leaves Some Questions
Unanswered, 75 CAL. CPA 31, 31 (2006) ("Distinguishing between mere symptoms of emotional
distress (no exclusion) and physical sickness (excludable) isn't easy ....
28. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
29. Some scholars have called for legislative or administrative change. See William H.
Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Tax Treatment ofSexual Harassment Awards: Clarifying the Threshold
for Exclusion, 30 J. LEGIS. 275, 277 (2004) (proposing regulations that physical injury or sickness
include medically diagnosed mental illnesses like PTSD, major depression, and panic disorder);
see also Laura Spitz, I Think, Therefore I Am; I Feel, Therefore I Am Taxed: Descartes, Tort
Reform, and the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 N.M. L. REv. 429, 447 (2005) (calling for a
constitutional challenge of § 104(a)(2) under the equal protection clause); Mark J. Wolff, Sex,
Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1486 (2000)
(suggesting a return to the pre-1996 version of § 104(a)(2) as well as a revenue offset in the form
of denied deductions for payments made by the tortfeasor); Kurt A. Leeper, Note, Arguably
Arbitrary: Taxation and the Physical Injury Requirement oflR. C. Section 104(a)(2), 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1039, 1068-71 (2005) (calling for a return to the post-1989 statute, which required
that punitive damages involve only physical injury or sickness to be excluded from gross income,
or a complete repeal of § 104(a)(2)). But see Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893, 895-96 (6th
Cir. 2003) (rejecting an equal-protection challenge to § 104(a)(2)). Even the National Taxpayer
Advocate recommends legislation that would exclude from gross income settlements received for
"mental anguish, emotional distress, and pain and suffering." 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
1, at 323.
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PTSD, are physical injuries or sicknesses or whether they are emotional
distress.
Part I of this Comment discusses § 104(a)(2) prior to the 1996 amendment.
It then analyzes the legislative record of the 1996 amendment and discusses
how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and courts have interpreted the
amendment. Next, this Comment surveys existing legal and medical literature,
as well as Congress's recent Mental Health Parity and Equity Addiction Act of
2008, to highlight legal, medical, and societal changes regarding the definition
of physical injury or sickness. Part II analyzes several interpretations of
§ 104(a)(2)'s physical injury or sickness requirement. Finally, Part III
proposes that courts adopt the definitions of "physical injury or sickness" and
"emotional distress" provided by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, and asserts
that brain-based injuries or sicknesses fit within the meaning of "physical"
under § 104(a)(2), as well as its historical underpinnings.
1. THE EXCLUSION OF PHYSICAL INJURY DAMAGES UNDER I.R.C. § 104(A)(2)
AND MODERN-DAY DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PHYSICAL INJURY OR SICKNESS
AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Section 104(a) (2) Before 1996: Interpreting "Personal Injury" Broadly
and More Favorably to Taxpayers
The Tax Code has included a form of § 104(a)(2) since 1918.30 The historic
rationale for the exclusion is closely related to the tenet that a return of capital
is not income:31 for example, if a taxpayer buys corporate stock for $100 and
then sells that stock for $200, the first $100 received on the sale is not taxed
because it is a return of the taxpayer's original investment.32 Personal-injury
damage awards are seen as making the human whole again, thus returning the
"human capital" lost to the injury.33 Under this "return of human capital"
doctrine, personal injury awards are similar to a return of financial capital, and
therefore are not considered income.34
Prior to 1996, § 104(a)(2) excluded damage awards received on account of
personal injury or sickness from gross income. 35 The statute read, in pertinent
part: "gross income does not include . . . the amount of any damages received
. . . on account of personal injuries or sickness."36 Courts articulated broad
30. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919); see
also O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996) (noting that the history of § 104(a)(2)
began in 1918).
31. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
32. Id. §§ 1001(a), 1011(a), 1012.
33. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86.
34. See id at 84-87; Spitz, supra note 29, at 439 (discussing the origin of the human-capital
theory); Leeper, supra note 29, at 1044-48 (discussing the human-capital theory in detail).
35. 1.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
36. Id.
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definitions of personal injury or sickness, encompassing a wide range of both
physical and nonphysical injuries including, damages to reputation and
character.37 Because the statute, regulations, and legislative history provided
little guidance, § 104(a)(2) prompted significant litigation that ultimately led to
three U.S. Supreme Court cases.
1. The Two-Prong Test Established in Burke and Schleier: Tort or Tort-
Type Rights and on-Account-ofPersonal Injuries
The Supreme Court first analyzed § 104(a)(2) in United States v. Burke.39
Burke filed a discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), his employer. 4 The suit
resulted in a settlement award from which the TVA withheld taxes.41 Burke
later requested a refund of the withheld taxes, but the IRS denied his request.42
The Court held that the award was not excluded from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) because Title VII, "whose sole remedial focus is award of back
wages, [does not] redress[] a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2)." 43 Burke thus requires that a taxpayer's personal injury award be
based in tort to be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
The Su reme Court emphasized the tort requirement in Commissioner v.
Schleier. Schleier created a two-prong test to determine whether a damage
37. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992); Volz & Tazian, supra note
29, at 277 (pointing out that the exclusion was interpreted broadly).
38. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81; Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1995), superseded
by statute, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755; Burke,
504 U.S. at 230; see also Wolff, supra note 29, at 1395-96 (stating that O'Gilvie was the third
case to reach the Supreme Court).
39. Burke, 504 U.S. at 230; see Volz & Tazian, supra note 29, at 281 (discussing the Burke
decision as the first of three Supreme Court decisions regarding § 104(a)(2)).
40. Burke, 504 U.S. at 230-31.
41. Id. at 231.
42. Id. at 232.
43. Id. at 241; cf id. at 241 n.12 (declining to apply the remedial scheme of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which allows for redress of tort-like personal injury awards). In its decision, the
Court emphasized a long-held requirement under the § 104(a)(2) regulations that the personal
injury be "linked" to "traditional tort principles." Id. at 234; see also Johnson v. Comm'r, 97
T.C.M. (CCH) 1860, 1862 (2009) (noting that because a breach of contract is not a tort, the award
is taxable).
44. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1995), superseded by statute, Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755; see also Volz & Tazian,
supra note 29, at 281-82 (observing that Schleier expanded the Burke decision). Almost every
modem-day discussion of § 104(a)(2) begins with Schleier v. Commissioner. See Phelps v.
Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, 1339-40 (2008) (beginning its analysis of § 104(a)(2) with
Schleier); Hawkins v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 310, 311 (2007) (citing the Schleier two-prong
test); Connolly v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138, 1139 (2007) (same); Amos v. Comm'r, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 665 (2003) (citing Schleier); Knoll v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 396, 400
(2003) (same); Collins v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1620, 1623 (2002) (same); Robert W.
Wood, Should False Imprisonment Damages Be Taxable, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38,40 (2009).
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award is excluded under § 104(a)(2). 4 5  Schleier filed suit against United
Airlines (United) for terminating him in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).46 Schleier and United reached a settlement
providing $145,629 in "backpay" and "liquidated damages." 47 He excluded
the liquidated damages from his gross income but included the backpay.48
The United States Tax Court held that the settlement should be excluded
from Schleier's gross income,49 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.o In reversing
the Fifth Circuit, the Court focused its decision on the language of § 104(a)(2),
that an award would be excluded "on account of personal injuries or
sickness."51 Because the taxpayer's ADEA award was not "on account of
personal injuries or sickness," but rather was for back ay, the plain language
of § 104(a)(2) precluded exclusion from gross income. The Court reiterated
the two-prong test that taxpayers must satisfy before personal injury or
sickness damages may be excluded under § 104(a)(2): "First, the taxpayer
must demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the
recovery is 'based upon tort or tort type rights'; and second, the taxpayer must
show that the damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or
sickness."'53
45. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337.
46. Id at 325.
47. Id at 326. Schleier did not report the settlement on his 1986 tax return and the IRS
issued a notice of deficiency. Id at 327.
48. Id at 327.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 329.
52. Id at 330 ("Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off
on account of his age as the proximate cause of respondent's loss of income, neither the birthday
nor the discharge can fairly be described as a 'personal injury' or 'sickness."').
53. Id. at 336-37. The IRS issued proposed regulations on September 15, 2009, that would
reverse the decision in Burke and eliminate the first prong: the requirement that the injury or
sickness be based in "tort or tort type rights." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,152
(Sept. 15, 2009). If codified, this would allow taxpayers to exclude physical injury or sickness
damages "even though the injury giving rise to the damages is not defined as a tort under state or
common law." Id. at 47,153. The proposed regulation would have prevented the taxpayer in
Burke from losing simply because the statute under which he filed suit did not provide for a
remedy based in tort. Id.; cf United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992). Although the
legislative history of the 1996 amendment supports this view, courts held steady to this
requirement. Compare Johnson v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1860, 1862 (2009) (holding that
breach of contract is not a tort and does not satisfy the first prong of Schleier), and Phelps v.
Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, 1340-41 (2008) (noting that relief granted under the Fair Labor
Standards Act is not for personal injury and therefore fails the first prong of Schleier), with Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,153 (concluding that "legislative and judicial
developments [after Burke] eliminated the need to base the section 104(a)(2) exclusion on tort
and remedies concepts").
The proposed regulation, however, does not address the real problem: physical injury or
sickness and emotional distress are still not defined. See Letter from John J. McCulloch, Vice
2010] 217
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2. Interpreting the "on Account ofPersonal Injuries " Requirement: More
than a "but for" Test
The third case to reach the Supreme Court on this issue was O'Gilvie v.
United States.54 O'Gilvie received a jury award of actual and punitive
damages from a tort suit he filed after his wife died from toxic shock
syndrome.55  The Court had to determine whether the punitive damages
received were "on account of personal injuries" as required by § 104(a)(2), and
thus excluded from gross income.56 The taxpayer asserted that "but for" the
tort, no punitive damages would have been awarded.5 The government
countered that § 104(a)(2) requires a more direct link between the damages and
the injury or sickness that formed the basis of the tort.
The Court adopted the government's more restrictive reading because,
among other reasons,59 the government's interpretation was "more faithful to
the history of the statutory provision . . . [and] basic tax-related purpose" of §
104(a)(2).60 The Court noted that the original enactment of § 104(a)(2)
suggested that Congress excluded personal injury damages from the definition
of income because they were paid, to make the person whole; therefore, they
President, Integrated Fin. Settlements, to Internal Revenue Service (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#docketDetail?D=IRS-2009-0023-0005.1
(commenting on the proposed regulation regarding the need for clarification of the physical injury
or sickness requirement); see also Wood, supra note 16, at 1337 ("Clearly, the release of
proposed regulations in September 2009 was welcome. Yet it was also a disappointment. After a
13-year gestation period, the proposed regulations do not attempt to define physical injury,
physical sickness-or for that matter-physical.").
54. O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996); see Fabry v. Comm'r, 223 F.3d 1261,
1265 & n.14 (1 Ith Cir. 2000); see also Wolff, supra note 29, at 1395-96.
55. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81. O'Gilvie and his family received $1,525,000 in actual
damages and $10,000,000 million in punitive damages from suit brought on behalf of his wife's
estate. Id
56. Id (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 1996
amendment made punitive damages taxable. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-88, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996); see infra Part I.C.
57. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 82.
58. Id. at 83. Moreover, the punitive damages were not paid "because of ... the personal
injuries," but rather to punish the tortfeasor. Id
59. Id The Court also held in favor of the government because its interpretation was more
consistent with the holding in Schleier that damages are excluded under the statute "not simply
because the taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element . . . satisfies the
requirement . . . that the damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."'
Id. at 84 (quoting Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995), superseded by statute, Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755) (omissions in original);
see also Fabry, 223 F.3d at 1269-70 ("[I]n order to ... qualify for the exclusion, it appears that a
cause and effect relationship must be established between the tort, the personal injury resulting,
and the amount received in settlement.").
60. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84-85.
[Vol. 60:211218
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were a "return [of] the victim's personal or financial capital. Consequently,
a taxpayer had to do more than show he suffered a personal injury. He had to
show that the damages paid were because of that injury.62
3. Courts Look Beyond the Words of the Settlement Agreement to Discern
the Payor's Intent Behind the Payment ofDamage Awards
Section 104(a)(2) excludes damages received "by suit or agreement."63
When addressing damages included in settlement agreements, courts consider
several factors to determine whether those damages satisfy Schleier's second
prong and were paid "on account of personal injury."64 Courts must determine
the payor's real reason for paying damages to the taxpayer apart from the
words of the agreement.65 For example, if the damages were for backpay, then
they were not paid "on account of personal injury" and cannot be excluded
from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 6
In Greer v. United States, the IRS asserted that a settlement agreement
between Greer and his former employer provided Greer with severance
payments, not personal injury damages. The Sixth Circuit held that a number
of factors should be considered to determine the nature of a settlement
agreement.68 First, courts should question the character of the plaintiffs claim
to determine whether the agreement was based on "tort or tort type rights."69
Second, courts should determine whether the plaintiff s claim actually "existed
at the time of the settlement." 70 Third, the claim must relate to an injury that is
61. Id. at 86 (internal quotation omitted); see also Spitz, supra note 29, at 439; Wolff, supra
note 29, at 1359; Leeper, supra note 29, at 1044-45.
62. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 85-86.
63. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
64. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329.
65. See Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 903 (2006).
66. See, e.g., Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327 (noting that the taxpayer included a backpay award
as gross income). Of equal importance is whether the terms of the settlement agreement were the
result of "good faith, adversarial, arm's-length negotiations." Knoll v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) 396, 400-01 (2003) ("The claim must be bona fide, but it need not be sustainable or
valid."); see also Goode, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 902 (finding that courts are not required to accept
settlement agreements "where circumstantial factors reveal that the designation of the settlement
proceeds was not the result of adversarial, arm's length, and good faith negotiations").
67. Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2000). Greer believed he was
wrongfully terminated by Ashland Oil, Inc. (AOI). Although Greer did not file suit, AOI agreed
to pay him $331,968 in exchange for his agreement to release AOl from any claims of wrongful
discharge. Id. Greer argued that the settlement was paid for wrongful discharge and injuries to
personal and professional reputation, excluding it from gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id. at
327-28. The district court agreed with Greer, and the government appealed. Id at 325-26.
68. Id. at 327.
69. Id; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334-35.
70. Greer, 207 F.3d at 327. This factor does not require that the taxpayer actually file suit.
Id. at 328; see Stocks v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 1, 10 (1992) ("Where a settlement agreement exists,
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personal.7 1  Finally, and most importantly, courts should examine the
"motivation behind the agreement itself. . . . If the agreement lacks express
language . . . [then courts should consider] other evidence that may shed light
on 'the intent of the payor as to the purpose in making the payment."' 72
Applying these factors in Greer, the court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, finding a lack of transparent intent on the part of the taxpayer's
employer.
4. The Definition of Personal Injury Under § 104(a) (2) Before 1996
Included Many Different Types of Injuries
The interpretation of a personal injury under the pre-1996 form of
§ 104(a)(2) was quite broad.74  Courts articulated a long list of personal
injuries that fell within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Most notable are the
following: "injuries . . . affecting the emotions, reputation, or character" ;76
"intangible as well as tangible harms";77 emotional distress";7 mental pain
and suffering;79 injury to personal and professional reputation; "distress,
humiliation, and mental anguish";81 intentional infliction of emotional
82 . ,83Alotay fdistress; and "the intangible harms of discrimination. Almost any kind of
tort or tort-type injury fell within the scope of the § 104(a)(2) personal injury
or sickness requirement before the 1996 amendment.
determining the exclusion from gross income depends on the nature of the claim that was the
actual basis for settlement rather than the validity of the claim." (second emphasis added)).
71. Greer, 207 F.3dat327-28.
72. Id at 329 (quoting Knuckles v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965)).
73. Greer, 207 F.3d at 329. The court found AOl's intent in paying $331,968 was not
easily discernable, particularly considering that the normal severance payment for an employee of
Greer's length of service was approximately $51,000. Id. at 334. On remand, the district court
found that the damages were paid on account of Greer's personal injuries, and therefore excluded
most of the payment he received from AOI from his gross income. Greer v. United States, 2001-
1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 87,865, 87,869 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
74. See Venable v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254, 256 (2003) (noting that prior to the
amendment, personal injury "embrace[d] 'nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those
affecting emotions, reputation, or character"' (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 236
(1992))), affd, 110 F. App'x 421 (5th Cir. 2004).
75. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 235 n.6.
76. Id
77. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1995), superseded by statute, Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
78. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 235.
79. See Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 1992).
80. See Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 848 F.2d 81, 83-84 (6th Cir. 1988) (including defamation
under California law); see Fabry v. Comm'r, 223 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that
damage to business reputation is a personal injury).
81. See Greer, 207 F.3d at 328.
82. See Bland v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1713, 1716 (2000).
83. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S 323, 332 n.6 (1995), superseded by statute, Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
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B. The Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996: The Exclusion for
Personal Injuries Is Severely Narrowed
The Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA) changed the scope
of § 104:84 Congress narrowed the pre-1996 exclusion by adding the word
"physical" to the statute.85  In signing the bill into law, President William
Jefferson Clinton expressed doubt about narrowing the statute. 86 The SBJPA
included an amendment to § 104 that narrowed the personal injury or sickness
exclusion in two ways. First, only those personal injuries and personal
sicknesses that are considered "physical" are excluded from income. Second,
emotional distress is not considered physical under the statute.89
The amended statute states that "gross income does not include . . . (2) the
amount of any damages . . . received . . . on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness . . . . For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness."90 it
appears that the addition of only a few words significantly changed the
exclusion. 9'
84. Notwithstanding the IRS's proposed regulations announced on September 15, 2009, the
Tax Court has consistently held that the two-prong test defined in Schleier remains the same,
except that "physical" was added to the second prong. See Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH)
901, 903 (2006). But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153 (Sept. 15,
2009) (reversing the outcome of Burke and "eliminating the requirement that 'personal injuries or
sickness' be 'based upon tort or tort type rights' (internal citation omitted)).
85. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED BY THE 104TH CONGRESS 222-24 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION], available at http://www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=2943.
86. Presidential Statement on Signing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1862, 1864. As President
Clinton stated,
Finally, I have reservations about a provision in the Act which makes civil damages
based on nonphysical injury or illness taxable. Such damages are paid to compensate
for injury, whether physical or not, and are designed to make victims whole, not to
enrich them. These damages should not be considered a source of taxable income.
Id. Despite his opposition to the § 104(a)( 2 ) amendment, the law increased the minimum wage
base, an important part of his agenda. Id. at 1862.
87. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85; see also Wolff, supra
note 29, at 1346.
88. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85.
89. Id at 224.
90. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Although damages on account of emotional
distress are not included in the gross-income exclusion, the last sentence of § 104(a) provides that
damages paid for emotional distress are excluded from gross income only to the extent the
taxpayer paid for medical expenses. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006); see also Prasil v. Comm'r, 85
T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1125-28 (2003). In other words, if the damages paid to the taxpayer are
reimbursement for amounts the taxpayer personally paid for medical expenses associated with
emotional distress, then those reimbursements are not taxable. Robert W. Wood, Tax Aspects of
Settlements and Judgments, 522-3rd TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) § 1II.3.E.b. (2009).
91. See infra Part I.C.
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Unfortunately, there is very little legislative history that supports or explains
the 1996 congressional amendment to § 104(a)(2). Requiring an injury or
sickness to be "physical" would reign in courts' broad and conflicting
interpretations of personal injury.92 The House Committee report states:
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of
damages received on account of personal injury or sickness broadly
in some cases to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to
a physical injury or sickness. For example, some courts have held
that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving certain
forms of employment discrimination and injury to reputation where
there is no physical injury or sickness. The damages received in
these cases generally consist of back pay and other awards intended
to compensate the claimant for lost wages or lost profits.93
Based on this excerpt from the House Committee report, several inferences
can be drawn. First, the expanded interpretation of personal injury or sickness
by courts resulted in backpay, lost profits, or lost wages being excluded from
gross income. 94  Congress never intended these items to be excluded from
gross income. 95 Second, excluding awards for damage to reputation and
discrimination from gross income does not comport with the human-capital
doctrine96 because, absent a physical injury, the taxpayer has not lost human
capital.97 Finally, Congress intended to decrease litigation "for cases that do
not involve physical injury or physical sickness." 98
92. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85, at 223 (stating that
the "confusion ... has led to substantial litigation"). In repealing the gross-income exclusion for
punitive damages, the Senate reasoned that "[p]unitive damages are intended to punish the
wrongdoer and are not intended to compensate the claimant (e.g., for lost wages or pain and
suffering). Thus, they are a windfall to the taxpayer and appropriately should be included in
taxable income." S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 115 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1589-90; see also O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300 (emphasis added); see also GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85.
94. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85.
95. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955); see also I.R.C.
§ 61(a) (2006) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived . . .
96. See supra Part L.A.
97. See supra Part L.A.
98. Hennessey v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1756, 1758 (2009); see also GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 85, at 223 ("The confusion as to the tax
treatment of damages received in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness has led
to substantial litigation . . . ."). Litigation under § 104(a)(2) did not decrease as Congress
predicted, however, because the line between what is physical versus what is emotional distress is
unclear. See 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 446-47.
Some suggest other motives behind the 1996 amendment. One scholar has suggested that the
real reason for the amendment was to "limit the benefit and effectiveness of the newly extended
Civil Rights Act remedies." Spitz, supra note 29, at 441. But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 75
Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153 (Sept. 15, 2009) (concluding that the tort and remedy requirement was
eliminated with the 1996 amendment). Another has suggested that an "unconscious legislative
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C. Section 104(a) (2) After 1996: Analyzing the Physical Injury or Sickness
Exclusion with an Emotional Distress Exception
Three areas provide insight into the definition of and distinction between
physical injury or sickness and emotional distress: (1) the SBJPA 2006
legislative history, (2) IRS pronouncements, and (3) Tax Court and circuit
court decisions.
1. With Little Discussion of What Physical or Emotional Distress Means,
Congress Provided Footnote 56
In describing emotional distress, Congress stated that "[i]t is intended that
the term emotional distress includes symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches,
stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional distress." 99 This
one sentence, a footnote in the legislative history of the SBJPA, is the sum and
substance of Congress's definition of emotional distress. This footnote is
usually the only piece of legislative history cited by courts to understand what
Congress meant by physical injury or sickness versus emotional distress.100
Aside from this footnote, the House Conference Report states that "[i]f an
action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages
(other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments
received on account of physical injury or physical sickness."101  Without
specifically defining either term, if the injury or sickness is considered
physical, then both physical and emotional distress damages "that flow
and judicial discrimination played a part in the 1996 amendments." Wolff, supra note 29, at
1468-70 (using cognitive theory to explain a long-held bias toward those with nonphysical
injuries).
99. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
100. See, e.g., Longoria v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 18 (2009); Hellesen v. Comm'r,
97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1810, 1812 n.3 (2009); Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 903 (2006);
Hawkins v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470, 1472 (2005). The footnote, however, is
undoubtedly confusing because stomach disorders and headaches are physical sicknesses.
101. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301. The Conference Report goes on to state:
[W]hether or not the recipient of the damages is the injured party . . . the
exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages received .. . based on
a claim of employment discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied by a
claim of emotional distress. Because all damages received on account of physical
injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from
gross income applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional
distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.
Id.
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therefrom" are excluded.10 2  But, if the injury or sickness is considered
emotional distress, then the personal injury damages are not excluded.103
2. Not to Be Outdone by Congress, the IRS Remains Quiet and Elusive with
Respect to the Physical Injury Exclusion and the Emotional Distress
Exception
The IRS has largely remained silent on what exactly a physical sickness or
physical injury is and how it is different from emotional distress.104 Because
the regulations have not changed since the 1996 amendment, they are of no
help.' The most informative guidance comes in the form of two Private
Letter Rulings (PLRs)106 issued in 2000 and 2001,107 and a Chief Counsel
Advisory (CCA) Memorandum issued in 2008.0
The 2000 PLR, known as the "bruise" ruling, responded to a taxpayer's
question of whether damages received under a settlement agreement were
excluded under § 104(a)(2).10 9  The letter to the IRS explained that A was
102. Id.; see Hawkins, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1472 ("[L]egislative history make[s] clear that
damages for emotional distress and resultant symptoms are not excluded .... ). But "[olnce the
'physical' threshold is reached, compensation for a broad range of psychological and emotional
damages can be excluded from the taxpayer's income." Volz & Tazian, supra note 29, at 285.
103. Hawkins, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1472; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 75 Fed. Reg.
47,152, 47,153 (Sept. 15, 2009); I.R.S. Pub. 17, at 93 (2009). Additionally, it would seem that
Congress's intent was to tax discrimination awards where no physical injury or sickness was
present. As the House Report states, "some courts have held that the exclusion applies to
damages in cases involving . . . employment discrimination . . . where there is no physical injury
or sickness." H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 142-43 (1996). The report concludes that the "exclusion
from gross income does not apply to . . . a claim of employment discrimination . . . accompanied
by a claim of emotional distress." Id. at 144. Taken together, a reasonable reading of the
legislative history would suggest that damages for discrimination that are accompanied by a
physical injury or physical sickness are still excluded under § 104(a)(2). Hawkins, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1472.
104. Robert W. Wood, IRS Allows Damages Exclusion Without Proof of Physical Harm, in
118 TAx NOTES 1388 (2008).
105. Wood, supra note 16, at 1337 (arguing the new regulations offer little help). But see
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153 (Sept. 15, 2009).
106. A letter ruling is a response from the IRS to a written request by a taxpayer asking for
guidance on how the IRS will treat a particular set of facts. Rev. Proc. 2009-1, 2009-1 I.R.B. 6,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb09--01.pdf. It is binding on the IRS with respect
to the taxpayer who requested the PLR, and may not be used by other taxpayers. Id. at 47. Letter
rulings are helpful because they provide an indication of how the IRS might interpret the Tax
Code under a given set of facts. See Byrne v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 704, 710 n.14 (2002)
("Although private letter rulings are not precedent, . . . they do reveal the interpretation put upon
the statute by the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the revenue laws.").
107. IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200121031 (Feb. 16, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July
17, 2000).
108. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200809001 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-wd-1080900 1.pdf.
109. Wood, supra note 104, at 1389.
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sexually harassed by C via physical touching and "lewd remarks.""10  A,
however, experienced no "observable bodily harm (e.g. cuts, bruises, etc.)."'
C also assaulted A, causing "extreme pain."I12 The IRS concluded that the
damages associated with these contacts were not excludable under § 104(a)(2)
because they were a "pain incident"; the implication being that even though
there was physical pain, the taxpayer suffered no physical injury.113
After the "First Pain Incident," C assaulted A again, "cutting her and biting
her."ll 4 The IRS excluded from gross income all damages associated with this
incident as well as those emotional damages "properly allocable to [it].""'5 In
defense of its conclusion, the IRS noted that "[t]he term 'personal physical
injuries' is not defined in either § 104(a)(2) or the legislative history of the
1996 Act" and concluded that the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary,
which "defines the term 'physical injury' as 'bodily harm or hurt, excluding
mental distress, fright, or emotional disturbance,"' was the appropriate
definition." 6  Therefore, "physical contacts resulting in observable bodily
harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding are personal physical
injuries under § 104(a)(2)."" 7
The 2001 PLR concluded that damages received from a settlement for lung
cancer attributed to asbestos were related to a physical disease and were
therefore excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2)." The taxpayer
contracted lung cancer from inhaling asbestos fibers."19 Even though asbestos
fibers are invisible to the naked eye,120 the IRS still found that the taxpayer
suffered a physical sickness. 1 By implication, therefore, a person can have
physical injuries or physical sickness even though there are no visible contacts
or touchings.122






116. Id (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). Black's has revised
its definition, however. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 789 (7th ed. 1999) ("bodily injury.
Physical damage to a person's body. - Also termed physical injury.").
117. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022. The "bruise ruling" left unanswered whether
"observable bodily harms" are sufficient or necessary to have a physical injury or sickness.
Wood, supra note 104, at 1389.
118. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200121031 (Feb. 16, 2001).
119. Id.
120. Asbestos, Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/
Asbestos/ (last updated Apr. 1, 2008).
121. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200121031.
122. See Wood, supra note 27, at 31 ("While there was no physical contact or touching
between the taxpayer's husband and the manufacturers, Letter Ruling 200121031 upholds the
exclusion.").
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In the 2008 CCA,12 3 the facts indicated that C continued to suffer trauma
from a physical injury sustained when C was a minor.124 The IRS concluded
that the inability of C to "establish[] the extent of his physical injuries" did not
defeat C's exclusion under § 104(a)(2). 12 5
The inferences from these three IRS rulings that observable bodily harms are
sufficient to constitute physical injury or sickness under § 104(a)(2).
Unobservable bodily sicknesses, objectively identified through the use of
medical technology, are also sufficient to constitute physical sickness. The
ability to establish the magnitude of a physical injury is not necessary to fall
within the definition of "physical" under the statute.
3. Federal Courts Attempt to Distinguish Between Physical Injury or
Sickness and Emotional Distress: Clear as Mud
Courts, predominantly the Tax Court, have struggled with the definition of
and distinction between physical injury or sickness and emotional distress
under § 104(a)(2).126 Most of the Tax Court's decisions with respect to the
definition of "physical" or "emotional distress" are conclusory. They conclude
that a taxpayer's injury or sickness is not physical, or that it is emotional
distress, without first defining those terms.127
123. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200809001 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-wd-080900 1.pdf.
124. Id
125. Id This conclusion "can perhaps be read as admitting of the possibility that the
observable bodily harm standard the IRS has informally adopted is too tough." Wood, supra note
104, at 1390.
126. Usually, the court refers to either the legislative history or Black's Law Dictionary. See,
e.g., Prasil v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1127 (2003) (referring to the legislative history of
the SBJPA). Interestingly, none of the cases surveyed in this section discuss the basic rules of
statutory construction for revenue acts. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (per
curiam) ("[T]he words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be interpreted where possible
in their 'ordinary, everyday senses."' (quoting Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947))).
127. In most instances, the Tax Court does not even consider the "everyday meaning of [the]
words" physical or emotional, but instead resorts immediately to footnote 56 of the SBJPA
congressional record, which defines emotional distress as "insomnia, headaches, and stomach
disorders." H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep); see, e.g., Johnson v.
Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1860, 1861 n.5 (2009); Phelps v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336,
1340 n.6 (2008); Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 903 (2006); Amos v. Comm'r, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 666 n.4 (2003); Venable v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254, 256 (2003),
aff'd, 110 F. App'x 421 (5th Cir. 2004).
On the other hand, where the statute is ambiguous, the court can and often will look to
legislative history, as well as other non-statutory sources, to understand Congress's intent. See
J.M. Huber Corp. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 659, 664 (1993) ("Statutory interpretation of
Internal Revenue Code provisions in particular involves looking at the plain meaning first, then
examining legislative history to discern the intent of Congress where there is ambiguity in the
statute"). Given the often immediate reference to § 104(a)(2)'s legislative history, one can infer
that courts consider § 104(a)(2) patently ambiguous.
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One attempt by the Tax Court to provide a cogent definition came from
Judge David Laro in Hawkins v. Commissioner.128  Hawkins received a
settlement payment because of race discrimination.129 In concluding that the
payor did not pay the damages because of physical injury or sickness, the Tax
Court referred to the definition of emotional distress in Black's Law
Dictionary: 'emotional distress' denotes 'A highly unpleasant mental reaction
(such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another
person's conduct; emotional pain and suffering."'130  Because the Tax Court
found that the taxpayer's settlement payment was for emotional distress, the
payment was not excluded from gross income.131
a. Fatigue, Sleeplessness, and Indigestion
In most cases, the courts do not define emotional distress, but take the
approach that "[they will] know it when [they] see it."l 32 In Lindsey v.
Commissioner, Lindsey received a $2,000,000 settlement. 3 3 Lindsey tried to
exclude the settlement from his gross income under § 104(a)(2), asserting that
he suffered physical injuries and sicknesses during the settlement
negotiations.134  At trial, Lindsey's physician testified that Lindsey suffered
from hypertension, fatigue, and loud snoring. 35  The Tax Court held that
"fatigability, occasional indigestion, and difficulty sleeping-are the types of
injuries or sicknesses that Congress intended to be encompassed within
the definition of emotional distress." 36 Accordingly, the Tax Court included
128. Hawkins v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 310, 312 (2007).
129. Id at 311.
130. Id. at 312 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 542 (7th ed. 1999)).
131. Id
132. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
133. Lindsey v. Comm'r (Lindsey 1), 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295, 1296 (2004), aff'd, 422 F.3d
684 (8th Cir. 2005). Lindsey was the CEO of Empire Gas Corporation (EGC), "a company
engaged in the liquefied petroleum business." Id. Northwestern Growth Company was another
petroleum company, and the two companies "entered into an agreement ... to acquire Synergy, a
propane company." Id A dispute arose between the two companies that led to a termination
agreement that would pay Lindsey $2,000,000. Id The settlement agreement stated the payment
was for "tortious interference with contracts ... injury to Mr. Lindsey's personal and professional
reputation and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment." Id
134. Id at 1297-98.
135. Id at 1298.
136. Id; see also Sanford v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1618, 1620 (2008) (finding that
sexual harassment and subsequent physical symptoms of stress were properly classified as
emotional distress); Bond v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 445, 446-47 (2005) (analyzing
depression under the emotional-distress exclusion provision in § 104(a)(2) and inferring that
Bond's depression was emotional distress).
Similarly, mental anguish is not a physical injury. In Venable v. Commissioner, Venable filed
suit on behalf of her late husband, Hubbard. Venable v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254, 255
(2003), affd, 110 F. App'x 421 (5th Cir. 2004). Hubbard ran a software company, and one of his
investors accused him of theft of accounts receivable. Id Hubbard was criminally prosecuted,
but the charges were later dismissed. Id Venable sued the investor for malicious prosecution,
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Lindsey's settlement in his gross income.137
b. Physical Restraint Through False Imprisonment: Still Deemed Not
Physical
Meeting the physical-injury test is difficult. In Stadnyk v. Commissioner,
Stadnyk, a resident of Kentucky, received damages based on a claim of false
imprisonment. 38  A mediation agreement resulted in a $49,000 settlement.'39
At trial, the IRS argued that the settlement was not paid for "physical restraint
and detention," but rather for emotional distress. 140 The Tax Court agreed and
held that "[p]hysical restraint and physical detention are not 'physical injuries'
for purposes of [exclusion under] section 104(a)(2)."141
In support of its decision, the Tax Court referred to the definition of false
imprisonment under Kentucky law and found that injury for false
imprisonment was "one where the plaintiff c[ould] recover for mental suffering
and humiliation."1 42 Having found that Stadnyk's award was compensation for
a nonphysical injury, the court concluded that her award was taxable.143
and a jury awarded her $437,300. Id. The bulk of the award was for mental anguish and loss of
reputation. Id. Concluding that these damages were exactly the type no longer excluded under
the statute, the court held for the Commissioner. Id. at 259. Therefore, Venable's jury award was
not excluded from her gross income. Id
137. Lindsey I, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1298. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision that "stress-related symptoms, including periodic impotency, insomnia, fatigue,
occasional indigestion, and urinary incontinence[]" are all symptoms related to emotional distress.
Lindsey v. Comm'r (Lindsey II), 422 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2005). The court concluded that
these "nonphysical . . . damages . . . are no longer excludable as gross income following the
enactment of the 1996 amendment." Id at 689.
138. Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 476 (2008), aff'd, 367 F. App'x 586 (6th
Cir. 2010). Stadnyk purchased an automobile that stopped working shortly after she drove it off
the lot. Id. at 475. The dealer was elusive and unresponsive to her complaints, so she directed
her bank to put a stop payment on her check for the car payment. Id A bank error resulted in the
check being marked "NSF" for insufficient funds. Id. The dealer, believing that Stadnyk
intentionally passed a bad check, contacted the police and had her arrested. Id. She was
handcuffed in front of her family, transported to the county jail, strip-searched, and made to wear
an orange jump suit. Id After the criminal charges were dropped, she filed suit against the bank
for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 475-76. Stadnyk also filed suit against the auto dealer and its
owner for "[m]alicious prosecution . . . false imprisonment, defamation, and outrageous conduct."
Id. at 476. This suit was settled and dismissed. Id. The terms of the settlement were not
reported. Id.
139. Id at 476.
140. Id at 477.
141. Id at 478.
142. Id But see Wood, supra note 27, at 41 ("[T]here is nothing mental about being locked
behind bars and subjected to the physical confinement it entails . . . the primary thrust of a false
imprisonment claim is not mental.").
143. See Stadnyk, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478.
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c. Physical Manifestation ofEmotional Distress
Even more confusing than the holding in Stadnyk is the Tax Court's
guideline regarding physical manifestation of emotional distress. In Goode v.
Commissioner, Goode received $135,000 from a settlement agreement with the
District of Columbia.144 In his complaint against the District of Columbia,
Goode asserted "physical pain and physical upset."l 45 However, he alleged at
trial that the settlement payment was compensation for "migraine headaches,
stomachaches, and hand numbness."1 46  The Tax Court found for the
Commissioner, holding that Goode did not suffer a physical injury or sickness,
but rather suffered physical manifestations of emotional distress.147 Therefore,
his award was taxable. 48
d. Aggravation ofExisting Physical Sickness
In a 2010 decision, Domeny v. Commissioner, the Tax Court found that
damages paid due to aggravation of an existing physical sickness fell
within the § 104(a)(2) definition of a physical injury or sickness and was not
144. Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 902 (2006). The suit against the District of
Columbia was for "infringement of [Goode's] First Amendment rights ... and violation of the
D.C. Whistleblower Reinforcement Act of 1998." Id
145. Id.
146. Id. at 904.
147. Id.; see also Shaltz v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1489, 1490 (2003) (inferring that
mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment caused by sexual harassment are not considered
physical injuries or sickness). In Shaltz v. Commissioner, the issue for the Tax Court was whether
$30,000 that Shaltz received in settlement of her complaint against General Motors (GM) for
sexual harassment was for physical injury or sickness, and therefore excluded from gross income.
Id The court held that Shaltz's $30,000 receipt was taxable because her complaint did not assert
any physical injuries. Id. at 1491-92 & n.6. Additionally, although Shaltz provided a letter from
her physician stating that she suffered from "depression, anxiety, stress, and recurrent past
stressors," the court noted that the facts provided did not "link [her] disability ... with the sexual
harassment complaint or, more importantly, to GM's settlement of that complaint." Id. at 1492
n.6. Although it is not clear whether the court's use of the term "disability" in reference to
Shaltz's depression means that depression is a physical sickness under § 104(a)(2), the court
could have easily dismissed the importance of the letter by concluding that depression was
emotional distress. See Goode, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 904-05 (holding that Goode's award was
taxable because he suffered only from physical manifestations of emotional distress).
148. Goode, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 905. The court also noted that even if he suffered a
physical injury or sickness, the settlement was not because of physical injuries; the District of
Columbia's representative at trial did not "recall requesting, receiving, or reviewing any medical
documentation corroborating petitioner's illness." Id. at 904. Further, the language of the
settlement agreement was contrived. Id. at 904-05.
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emotionaldistress.14 9 Domeny suffered from Multiple Sclerosis (MS). 50 Upon
starting a new job with a nonprofit organization that performed fundraising and
community outreach,1st tension between Domeny and her supervisor caused
her MS "symptoms to flare up."' 52 After Domeny discovered and reported that
her supervisor was embezzling funds, the supervisor fired her.'5 3 Subsequent
to Domeny's discharge, her attorney negotiated a settlement between Domeny
and her employer.154 Although the agreement provided that a portion of it was
for backpay, about fifty percent of the amount paid lacked any specific
language indicating the employer's intent in making the payment.' 55
The Tax Court had to decide whether the amounts were "received on
account of' Domeny's physical sickness.156 In concluding that the amounts
were paid for Domeny's physical sickness, and thus excluded from gross
income under § 104(a)(2), the Tax Court noted that "[Domeny's] work
environment exacerbated her existing physical illness . . . . [H]er MS flareup
... was intense and long lasting." 57
D. Damages that Are Not Paid on Account ofPhysical Injuries Are Not
Excluded from Gross Income by § 104(a) (2), Even if the Taxpayer Suffered a
Physical Injury or Sickness
To be excluded from gross income, the payor's payment of damages to the
taxpayer must be primarily to compensate the taxpayer for physical injuries.,ss
149. Domeny v. Comm'r, No. 6975-08, 2010 WL 114287, at *5 & n.7 (T.C. Jan. 13, 2010).
But see Prasil v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1127 (2003) (requiring comparative evidence
to support the taxpayer's assertion that a hostile work environment exacerbated her existing
physical sickness).




154. Id at *2.
155. Id. at *4.
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id at *5.
158. See supra Part 1.A.2; see also Amos v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 666-67 (2003)
(allowing the taxpayer to exclude from taxation a settlement payment for unidentifiable physical
injuries); Benjamin T. Cory, Note, Amos v. Commissioner: The Ambiguous and Ever-Changing
Definition of What Constitutes a Personal Physical Injury Under Internal Revenue Code Section
104(a)(2), 66 MONT. L. REv. 247, 262 (2005) (concluding that "the tax court [in Amos] appears
to be willing to apply a more lenient standard than the 'cutting, bruising, or swelling' standard of
the IRS"). Amos was a cameraman working on the floor of an NBA game. Amos, 86 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 663. During the game, Dennis Rodman ran into a group of photographers and kicked
Amos. Id Amos went to the hospital with symptoms of "shooting pain to his neck immediately
after having been kicked in the groin." Id. Several weeks after the incident, Amos's attorney
reached a settlement agreement with Rodman in which Rodman agreed to pay Amos $200,000.
Id. at 664.
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When a court finds that the payment was not for physical injury or sickness,
the damage award will be taxable.159
The District of Columbia Circuit emphasized this requirement in Murphy v.
IRS. 1o Murphy received a $70,000 award for damage to her "vocational
reputation" and "past and future emotional distress" based on a claim of
employment discrimination.161 Murphy presented evidence, through the
testimony of her psychologist, indicating that she suffered from "'bruxism,' or
teeth grinding . . . [and] other 'physical manifestations of stress' including
'anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and dizziness." 1 62  She argued that
104(a)(2) does not require the physical injuries to result from a physical
stimulus. 16.3
Amos sought to exclude this payment from his gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id at 665.
The issue was whether Rodman paid the $200,000 because of Amos's physical injuries. Id. at
666. The IRS asserted that very little of the amount paid was for physical injuries because
"Rodman was skeptical about the extent of [Amos's] physical injuries." Id. The Tax Court
rejected this argument and held that "it is the nature ... of the claim settled, and not its validity,
that determines the exclusion" under § 104(a)(2); in this instance, "Rodman's dominant reason"
for settling was Amos's physical injuries from getting kicked. Id.
159. There are also instances where courts question the causal link between the payment for
damages and the injury asserted in the complaint. As required by O'Gilvie, the test is more than a
"but for" test; the payments must be made because of the taxpayer's physical injury. O'Gilvie v.
United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1986). In Johnson v. United States, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that Johnson's settlement payment was taxable. Johnson v. United States,
76 F. App'x 873, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2003). Citing O'Gilvie and concluding that the award was
taxable, the court rejected Johnson's argument that "but for" his physical injury he would never
have a claim that ultimately resulted in a damage award. Id at 877.
160. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy II), 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This
case is known more for the District of Columbia Circuit's original holding that § 104(a)(2) was
unconstitutional, a highly criticized decision that the court vacated and reversed. See Murphy v.
IRS (Murphy 1), 460 F.3d 79, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see
also Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v.
Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 187 n.80 (2007) ("The decision caused an uproar
in the tax community.").
161. Murphy 11, 493 F.3d at 172.
162. Id. (internal citation omitted). The psychologist based this on dental and medical
records, noting '"somatic' and 'emotional' injuries." Id Murphy also referred to the American
Heritage Dictionary for the definition of "somatic" as "'relating to, or affecting the body,
especially as distinguished from a body part, the mind, or the environment."' Id at 174 (internal
citation omitted).
163. Id at 175. In her reply brief, Murphy argued that "[i]f the amended statute is to have
any meaningful purpose, there must be a distinction between 'physical injuries or physical
sickness' and the term 'physical symptoms' as used in the legislative history." Reply Brief of
Appellants at 14, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-
5139). Additionally, Murphy argued in her initial brief that she "need[] [only] to show . . . she
received damages on account of physical injuries or physical sickness to qualify for the
exclusion." Appellant's Brief at 44, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No.
05-5139). One flaw, however, with Murphy's analysis of the statute is found in her initial brief
when she referred to her expert's conclusion that "emotional distress is always a physical injury
or physical sickness just like physical problems with other parts of the body." Id. at 10.
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The Commissioner avoided addressing Murphy's argument and instead
argued that Murphy failed to show that she was compensated "'because of her
physical injuries." 64  The District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the
Commissioner and noted that although Murphy "no doubt suffered from
certain physical manifestations of emotional distress," these injuries were not
the basis for her award.165 The origin of Murphy's claim was not her bruxism,
but her emotional distress.166
To exclude compensatory damages from gross income under § 104(a)(2), the
taxpayer's complaint must request damages because of an injury, assert that
this injury is a physical injury or sickness, and finally ensure that the physical
injury or sickness serves as the basis for any payments received.167
Accepting this conclusion would make the language regarding emotional distress in § 104(a)
surplusage. The plain language of § 104(a) excepts emotional distress from the definition of
"physical" under the statute. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006).
164. Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 175. But see Germain, supra note 160, at 189 (stating that
"physical manifestations of emotional distress, absent physical impact, [were not meant] to be
excluded from taxation").
165. Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 176; see also Hellesen v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1810,
1811-12 (2009) (reasoning that "physical problems" following termination did not exclude
damages because the complaint did not allege physical injury); Shelton v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1592, 1593-94 (2009) (declining to exclude damages for sexual harassment that resulted
in physical injuries because the class-action settlement mentioned only emotional and mental
anguish); Moulton v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1151, 1155 (2009) (refusing to exclude
damages because the mediation agreement made no mention of physical injury or sickness);
Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 904 (2006) (noting that damages did not "emanat[e]
from a physical manifestation of emotional distress"); Bond v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 445,
446 (2005) (noting that a settlement payment was not excluded because it "was not intended to
compensate petitioner for her carpel tunnel and back injuries"); Lindsey v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1295 (2004), aff'd, 422 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that even if the petitioner
suffered physical injuries or sickness, they were not the basis for the settlement agreement, and
the award was not paid because of physical injury or sickness); Cates v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ.
Op. 2003-15, 2003 WL 716270, at *3 (Feb. 28, 2003) ("Moreover, assuming that hypertension is
a physical injury (a point that we specifically do not decide) we cannot find that Rockford
intended to compensate petitioner for her hypertension.").
166. See Murphy II, 493 F.3d at 175. Similar to Murphy H, though a much more egregious
case of physical injury, is Longoria v. Commissioner, a case in which Longoria alleged race
discrimination that directly resulted in physical injuries; however, the settlement agreement for
$156,667 did not mention those physical injuries. Longoria v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 11, 13
(2009). Despite his numerous physical injuries, Longoria's complaint "[did] not allege that he
experienced physical injuries . . . as a result of his discrimination," but requested damages only
for "severe mental anguish; anxiety; stomach problems; sleep disorder; [and] stress." Id
Because these are considered symptoms of emotional distress, his entire award was taxable. Id at
15-16.
167. See, e.g., Volz & Tazian, supra note 29, at 278 ("In order for damages to be excludable,
the commission of sexual harassment must result in psychological trauma sufficient to cause
personal physical injury or physical sickness.").
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E. Changes in Law and Medicine Reflect a Changing Distinction Between the
Physical, the Mental, and the Emotional
1. Advances in Medical Science Moot the Distinction Between Physical and
Mentall68
As one commentator has stated, "A decade of unusually collaborative
research . . . illustrates that chronic major depression is as physical as diabetes
or heart disease."' 69 This statement summarizes the paradigm shift that has
occurred over the past twenty years in the field of major psychological
disorders: no longer are those with persistent, debilitating feelings of sadness
considered weak and expected to recover on their own. 170  Rather, these
feelings are emotional manifestations of physical impairments to the brain's
structure.171 Modem medical treatment and technology demonstrate that brain-
based sicknesses, such as PTSD and chronic major depression, have a
biological basis affecting the brain's structure and activity.172
Notably, this fact was affirmed by the United States Surgeon General when
he also "conclude[d] [that] mental illnesses are biological brain disorders that
can be helped by medical treatment."173  Even the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) acknowledges that "the term mental
disorder . . . implies a distinction between 'mental' disorders and 'physical'
disorders that is a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism .. . and
. . . the term persists in the title of DSM-IV because we have not found an
appropriate substitute."l 74 These views are consistent with the Journal of the
American Medical Association finding that chronic major depression is "as
168. See Richard E. Gardner III, Mind over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful
Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 675 (2000)
("[A]dvances [in] modem brain science and neuropsychology ... suggest[] that a distinction
between the physical and the mental is, in many circumstances, spurious.").
169. Brian Vastag, Decade of Work Shows Depression Is Physical, 287 JAMA 1787, 1787
(2002); see also AARON T. BECK & BRAD A. ALFORD, DEPRESSION CAUSES AND TREATMENT
xix, (2d ed. 2009) (noting that "depression research is vibrant and ever-changing," and detailing
the physical aspects of depression).
170. Vastag, supra note 169, at 1787.
171. See id; Michele G. Sullivan, Deep Brain Stimulation Lifts Severe Depression:
Technique May Suppress Activation of Brain Region That Malfunctions in Cases of Resistant
Disease, 36 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS 20 Oct. 2008), available at
http://clinicalpsychiatrynews.com (acknowledging the physical manifestations of depression and
explaining the success of deep brain stimulation in treating the physical symptoms of the disease).
172. Sullivan, supra note 171, at 20.
173. Gardner, supra note 168, at 682. Mental illnesses, such as major depression, panic
disorder, and PTSD, are "now considered physical, or biological, rather than 'mental."' Id. at
682-85.
174. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR xxx (4th ed. 2000).
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physical as diabetes or heart disease." 75 These findings provide a logical basis
for concluding that brain-based illnesses are physical sicknesses.176
2. The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008 Acknowledges the Physical Sickness of the
Brain
Congress also understands that brain-based injuries and mental illnesses
constitute physical impairments.177 Although the current Congress's definition
of a physical injury or sickness is not binding on the 104th Congress's
amendment to § 104(a)(2),178 where an earlier Congress's meaning is unclear,
as is the case with the 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2), a later Congress's
understanding is relevant.'7 9  By passing the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
(MHPAEA), Congress conveyed its current opinion regarding "physical"
sickness. The MHPAEA requires insurance companies to treat mental illness
no differently than traditional physical illness. 80  This requirement
175. Vastag, supra note 169, at 1787; see also Gardner, supra note 168, at 686 ("Science
continues to provide evidence that serious mental illnesses are actually physical diseases of the
brain.").
176. See Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, It's All in Your Head-Defining Psychiatric
Disabilities as Physical Disabilities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 97, 99 (2000) ("An overwhelming
amount of scientific data proves that psychiatric disabilities are physical in nature."). The
physical and psychosomatic disabilities differ because medical treatments have "actual or
potential effectiveness" in treating disabilities. Id. at 102; see also id. at 105 ("[B]ecause mental
impairments result from disorders of the brain, a physical organ, the line between physical and
mental impairments is gray."). The authors conclude that "the signs and symptoms which
characterize psychiatric disabilities correspond with broad anatomical regions of the brain and are
therefore 'physical disabilities."' Id at 110-11.
177. See Robert Pear, House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2008, at A14 (reporting that the "biological causes" of mental illness was one of several reasons
Congress cited in support of this bill).
178. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) ("[W]hile
the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one,
such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the
enacting Congress is obscure." (internal citations omitted)).
179. Id.
180. Pear, supra note 177, at A14. Ironically, the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) was
passed in 1996, the same year Congress amended the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 701, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996). The MHPA required
equal footing for lifetime caps, while the MHPAEA required equal footing for premiums and
copayments. Paul Wellstone and Pete Dominici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512, 122 Stat. 3765, 3862; see also The Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act, CTRS. FOR THE MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/healthinsreformforconsumer/104_thementalhealthparityact.asp (last
modified Apr. 14, 2010). Lifetime caps are the maximum available benefits under a health
insurance plan; once a person reaches his or her lifetime cap, the insurance company will no
longer pay benefits. Melissa Jeffries, How Coinsurance Works, DISCOVERY HEALTH,
http://health.howstuffworks.com/medicare/healthcare/insurance/coinsurance.htm/printable. Equal
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demonstrates Congress's recognition that mental illnesses are physical
illnesses, at least in the context of insurance. 181
3. Characteristics of a Physical Injury in a Non-Tax Context
The Tax Code is not the only body of law in which the definition of physical
injury has caused uncertainty and thereby forcing federal courts to define the
term physical injury. In Turturro v. Continental Airlines, for example,
Turturro had to prove a sufficient bodily injury to recover damages for
emotional distress caused by Continental's unwillingness to let him disembark
the plane.182 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, the district court noted that "bodily injury encompasses 'a change in the
structure of an organ,' and the brain's physical architecture can transform
during PTSD . .. fall[ing] within the ... definition of bodily injury."l 83 The
court's approach adopted a broader definition of physical injury than the IRS's
"bruise" ruling.184
4. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Better Attempt to Distinguish
Between Physical Injury or Sickness and Emotional Distress
Courts relying on the common law and Restatement approaches have
recognized a better way of defining physical injury or sickness. 85 Tentative
draft number five of the Restatement (Third) of Torts defines physical harm as
"physical impairment of the human body."'6 Recognizing the increasing
footing means that insurance companies must treat mental illness and physical illness equally.
See Pear, supra note 177, at A14.
181. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H1287 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2008) (statement of Rep. Patrick
Kennedy) ("[U]nfortunately . . . the brain is still relegated to that part of the world where people
think of it as something that should be in your controls . . . that even though you might have a
biochemical imbalance in your brain . . . it is your fault .... ); id. at H1288 (statement of Rep.
John Sullivan) ("[Mental illness] is a chemical imbalance of the brain, and I think it should be
treated like any other illness, and it is high time in this country that we do that."); id at H1291
(statement of Rep. Carolyn Maloney) ("We all know that mental illness is just like any physical
illness . . . . So it's amazing to me that some people still see mental illness as different and
separate from physical illness."); id at H1301 (statement of Rep. Mark Udall) ("[T]here remains
no scientific justification for treating mental health as separate and inferior to physical health.").
182. Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
183. Id at 179 (emphasis added) (quoting E. Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 541
(1991)).
184. See supra Part 1.C.2.
185. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992) ("[C]ommon law tort law
concepts are helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer is being compensated for a 'personal injury."'
(quoting Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988))).
The court recognized that damages for "emotional distress and pain and suffering" could be
recovered under state law. Id. at 235; cf Connolly v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1138, 1139
(2007) (referencing the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 4 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). Black's Law Dictionary defines bodily injury as "physical
damage to a person's body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004). It also defines
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difficulty in distinguishing between physical injuries and sicknesses and
emotional distress, 8 the draft Restatement provides, "[t]he essential
difference [between bodily harm and emotional disturbance] is that bodily
harm usually provides objective evidence of its existence and extent while the
only evidence of both the existence and severity of emotional disturbance is
usually the report of the person suffering it." 88
In its attempt to further distinguish between bodily harm and emotional
distress, the draft Restatement specifically rejects recovery under the physical-
harm provisions for such conditions as "nausea, headaches, and hysterical
attacks," reasoning that these conditions "dilute[e] the definition of bodily
harm." This conclusion is very similar, almost identical, to the House
Conference Committee's definition.190 Fortunately, the draft Restatement
further distinguishes bodily harm from emotional harm: "An actor who
negligently causes bodily harm through the mechanism of emotional
disturbance is subject to liability for the bodily harm."'91
This definition corresponds to the contextual framework of § 104(a)(2).
Section 104(a)(2) focuses on whether the taxpayer suffered a "personal
physical injur[y] or physical sickness."' 92 Whether the source of the physical
injury is a shock to the taxpayer's nervous system or a kick to the face should
not matter.
emotional distress as "a highly unpleasant mental reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright,
humiliation, or fury) that results from another person's conduct: emotional pain and suffering
... Also termed emotional harm; mental anguish; mental distress; mental suffering." Id at 563.
Although combining the two definitions from Black's provides a useful starting point, the draft
Restatement (Third) of Torts provides a more succinct understanding of physical injury and
emotional distress.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186, § 4 cmt. b.
188. Id
189. Id cmt. d.
190. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,
supra note 186, § 4 cmt. b. The Illustration provided by the draft Restatement is helpful:
Liz Labs negligently tests a sample from Dr. Kate and reports, erroneously, that the test
reveals that Dr. Kate had recently used illegal drugs. Upon being informed of this, Dr.
Kate suffers significant emotional harm, experiences several nights of troubled sleep,
the inability to eat very much for a couple of weeks, and occasional nausea during that
period. Recovery for Dr. Kate's emotional disturbance is subject to the requirements of
Chapter 8 [Liability for Emotional Disturbance].
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186, § 4 cmt. d., illus. I (emphasis added).
191. Id. § 47 cmt. b.
192. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006).
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II. DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF PHYSICAL INJURY OR SICKNESS AND
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Reference to State Law?
Drawing from the Tax Court's opinions, perhaps the distinction between
physical injury or sickness and emotional distress should be made with
reference to the state law where the taxpayer litigated the issue.193 The Tax
Court adopted this approach in Stadnyk v. Commissioner and referenced
Kentucky law to determine if Stadnyk's injury was physical or nonphysical. 194
However, if the determination of taxability relied on varying state laws, then
this approach might lead to disparities in horizontal equity. Moreover, any
determination of whether an injury or sickness is physical according to state
law would violate the long-standing rule reiterated in Greer that although
"state law creates legal interests, . . . the federal statute determines when and
how [those interests] shall be taxed."1 96 Thus, any classification of whether an
injury or sickness is physical under § 104(a)(2) should not require a reference
to state law.
B. Physical Impact Requirement?
One author's critique of the Murphy decision suggests that the legislative
history of § 104(a)(2) requires not only a physical injury or sickness, but also
that the injury or sickness be caused by a physical impact.' 97  The author
193. See Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[S]tate law creates legal
interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed." (quoting Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932))); see also Knoll v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 396, 400
(2003) (referring to Illinois tort law); Bland v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1713, 1716 (2000)
(referring to Oklahoma law for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Dana L.
Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America's Mental Health Dilemma? Current State
Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 353
(2005) ("Many state statutes narrowly define mental illness to include only those illnesses that are
'biologically-based' or 'serious."').
194. See Stadnyk v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 477 (2008), aff'd, 367 F. App'x 586
(6th Cir. 2010).
195. See James P. Angelini & Tracy Noga, Equity, Cost of Living, and the Internal Revenue
Code, 28 A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX'N NEWS Q., Summer 2009, at I (explaining that "[a] tax system is
considered horizontally equitable if it treats all taxpayers in the same economic situation in the
same fashion").
196. Greer, 207 F.3d at 327 (quoting Burnet, 287 U.S. at 110).
197. See Germain, supra note 160, at 203-05 ("[Tihere must be a proximate physical impact
causing an immediate physical injury or sickness (although not necessarily to the plaintiff) in
order to have a 'physical injury or physical sickness' from which excludable damages could
flow."). The author's phrase "not necessarily to the plaintiff' should not be interpreted to allow
the taxpayer to exclude damages paid where only the defendant suffered physical injury but not
the plaintiff taxpayer. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (providing an
example in which damages from loss of consortium (a form of emotional distress) were
excludable because the taxpayer's spouse suffered a physical injury).
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suggested that Murphy did not have a physical injury under § 104(a)(2)
because her bruxism was not the result of a physical impact.198
Although a physical-impact requirement might provide more clarity in the
statute, neither the plain language of § 104 nor the legislative history supports
such a narrow reading.199 The statute specifically covers "damages . . .
received . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness."200
Inferring a physical-impact requirement does not fit with the plain language of
§ 104(a)(2). Indeed, the statute's only requirement is that the physical injury
201
be personal.
C. Bruises and Cuts Required?
In the years that have passed since the IRS's bruise ruling,202 Tax Court
decisions and IRS PLRs have offered a much broader view of what constitutes
203
a physical injury or sickness under § 104(a)(2). In interpreting the IRS letter
rulings and Tax Court decisions, an injury or sickness does not need to be
visible to the naked eye for the taxpayer to be given an exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2); the injury can be demonstrated, for example, by an x-ray or other
objective evidence. The rulings imply that visible personal contact and
visible marks are not requirements; rather, the question is whether the injury or
sickness is a bodily one, and whether the taxpayer can offer objective evidence
demonstrating as much.
This conclusion is supported by the Tax Court's decision in Domeny.205
Domeny demonstrates that a taxpayer can meet the statute's physical
requirement without a showing of personal contact.206 Second, it demonstrates
that an emotional mechanism that triggers a physical response, like a hostile
work environment, will not automatically place the injury or sickness within
207the emotional distress exception. Lastly, the court's emphasis on the
"intens[ity]" and "long-lasting" nature of Domeny's sickness provides the
distinction that keeps her sickness out of the emotional distress exception.208
198. See supra Part I.D.
199. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143-44 (1996).
200. I.R.C. § 104(a).
201. Id The word "personal" is the only modifier behind "physical injury or sickness."
202. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
203. See Wood, supra note 104, at 1388; see also Cory, supra note 158, at 248.
204. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200121031 (Feb. 16, 2001); see also Amos v. Comm'r, 86
T.C.M. (CCH) 663, 664 (2003) (noting that x-rays were used to recognize an unidentifiable
injury).
205. See supra text accompanying note 149.
206. Compare Domeny v. Comm'r, No. 6975-08, 2010 WL 114287, at *2-5 (T.C. Jan. 13,
2010) (holding that a petitioner could recover without personal contact), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200041022 (July 17, 2000) (requiring uninvited personal contact as a prerequisite for physical
injury).
207. Domeny, 2010 WL 114287, at *3-4.
208. Id at *5.
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The court needed a way to differentiate physical manifestations of emotional
distress and a hostile work environment that exacerbated an existing sickness.
D. The Confusing Mantra: Physical Manifestations of Emotional Distress
The concept of physical manifestations of emotional distress, as articulated
in Murphy and Goode,209 has created more problems than it has solved.210 The
Tax Court considers headaches, nausea, fatigue, and sleeplessness to be
physical manifestations of emotional distress, fear, or embarrassment.211
These "symptoms" of emotional distress are indeed physical,212 but usually do
not injure, or produce sickness in any part of the human body.213
A person's nervous system is not normally injured or impaired, for example,
because a dog barked, and he felt fear.214 Indeed, there is no more bodily
injury involved when a person feels fear than when a person feels happiness.2
On the other hand, suppose that same dog's bark that shocked the man's
nervous system resulted in that man suffering a heart attack. It would seem
absurd to conclude that the taxpayer who suffered a heart attack had not
suffered a physical injury or sickness under § 104(a)(2), but instead a physical
manifestation of emotional distress. This absurd result, however, is the logical
209. See supra Part I.C.3.b (discussing Goode); see also supra Part I.D (discussing Murphy).
210. See 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 474-75.
211. See Goode v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 901, 903 (2006).
212. See Stephen S. Hall, Fear Itself N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 28, 1999, at 42 ("For more than
a century, scientists have pondered the nature of fear and anxiety, and how they cause the
physical symptoms that contribute to so much human suffering."); see also Understanding the
Biology ofFear, ARTICLE ALLEY (Nov. 10, 2007), http://www.articlealley.com/article 244638 2
3.html. Headaches are biologically based, but the congressional history specifically excludes
headaches from the definition of physical injury or sickness. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, 301
n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also JONATHAN M. BORKUM, CHRONIC HEADACHES: BIOLOGY,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT 102 (2007).
213. In a claim for emotional distress, there is generally no requirement for demonstration of
physical injury; rather, it is the tortfeasor's conduct that forms the basis for recovery. See Betsy J.
Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, 7 AM. J. OF
BIOETHICS, Sept. 2007, at 66; see also 38 A.L.R. 4th 998 ("To prevail on a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was reckless,
intentional, and so outrageous to such an extreme degree that it exceeds the bounds of decency
and, thus, is not tolerated by a civilized community." (citing Robinson v. Hill City Oil Co., 2 So.
3d 661, 668 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied, 999 So. 2d 1280 (Miss. 2009))).
214. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186, § 4 cmt. b ("[1]f the defendant's
negligent conduct (for example, negligent driving) frightens the plaintiff (for example, a
pedestrian crossing the street), the disturbance of the plaintiff's nerve centers caused by this fear
does not constitute physical harm.").
215. See Keith Kendrick, Address at Gresham College: The Future Biology of Happiness:
Lifestyle Changes or Recreational Drugs? (June 29, 2006), available at http://www.gresham.ac.
uk/event.asp?Pageld=45&Eventd=374 ("Happy people show strong activation in their left
prefrontal cortex whereas people experiencing negative emotions tend to have stronger activation
in the right prefrontal cortex.").
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conclusion to the Tax Court's "physical manifestation of emotional distress"
interpretation. 216 It should be abandoned.
Instead, emotional distress under § 104(a)(2) must be interpreted in light of
the emotional distress symptoms provided in the House Conference Report:
217insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders. To have meaning, this group
must consist of similar afflictions.2 18  The afflictions in this group are all
ephemeral with little or no permanent impairment to the body.2 Therefore,
the symptom group should only be expanded according to the characteristics of
the group; brain-based sicknesses and injuries do not fit within this group.220
Ill. ADOPTING A DEFINITION THAT FITS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, IRS
PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS, AND THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
Charles Allen's PTSD injury is unlike any other case presented and analyzed
thus far. Allen's PTSD, traditionally considered an intangible illness, was
caused by a physical impact, with no outward signs of cuts or bruises, yet
determined by a state court to be a bodily injury because of changes in the
internal structure of his brain.221 In light of the statute's language, purpose,
and legislative history,2 2 2 the court should adopt the definition of "physical"
articulated by the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts. It would provide an
objective measure for determining whether human capital has been lost and
would advance a workable solution to the problem.
216. See supra Part I.C.3.c.
217. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 n.56 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
218. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 243 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A] word is
known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a
word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts
of Congress." (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))).
219. Volz & Tazian, supra note 29, at 285. Although in Murphy the taxpayer provided
objective evidence of permanent damage to her teeth, her damages were not excluded from gross
income because the damages were paid to compensate for her emotional distress, not her bruxism.
Murphy 1, 460 F.3d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Had her
complaint asserted her physical injuries, and had she received damages for them, she should have
prevailed.
220. Volz & Tazian, supra note 29, at 285. As Volz and Tazian have stated,
The statutory requirement that the injury or sickness be 'physical' implies that
claims of psychological trauma or disorder be substantiated by medical examinations
. . . [that] establish a medical record substantiating the presence of an enduring or
persistent condition . . . . Congress intended that psychological damage[s] . . . must rise
above the short-lived distress of a headache or upset stomach to a level of persistence
or permanence more akin to a broken bone or a scar.
Id For example, after the first occurrence of a major depressive episode, the likelihood of
permanent brain damage increases. Vastag, supra note 169, at 1788.
221. Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Mich. App. 2008).
222. See supra Part lB.
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A. Adopting the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts Approach: Objective,
Identifiable Physical Injury or Sickness Excludes the Ephemeral and Conforms
to Congress's Intent
The draft Restatement (Third) of Torts adopts the proper balance between
223physical injury or sickness and emotional distress. Objective evidence of
bodily impairment,224 such as evidence of change in the structure of internal
225organs, will maintain the distinction between physical injury or sickness and
226symptoms of emotional distress, such as headaches and indigestion, that do
not result in any identifiable "long-lasting" impairment to the body.227
A distressful disturbance that causes the injury or illness,228 such as a hostile
work environment brought about by the tortfeasor's conduct,229 should not
preclude the injury or illness from being physical under § 104(a)(2).230 The
question is not how the taxpayer received the injury, but rather whether the
injury is indeed physical and whether the claim "ha[s] its origin in [that]
physical injury or sickness." 231
B. Brain-Based Injuries and Sicknesses Are Physical
As shown by advances in medical technology, brain-based illnesses, like
chronic major depression and PTSD, are physical sicknesses of the brain.232
The brain-based injury or sickness that is observed via changes in the brain's
233structure proves that part of the taxpayer's body has been impaired. Thus, a
recovery for impairment of the taxpayer's brain fits squarely within the human-
capital theory. It also fits within the plain language of § 104(a)(2), the
223. See supra Part I.E.4.
224. For example, a brain injury or illness may be identified through the use ofbrain-imaging
technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) or functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI). Through the use of PET scans and brain-imaging technology, this objective
evidence is available. An fIMRI is a form of neuorimaging that measures brain activity. An MRI
is also a form of neuroimaging, but it measures the brain's structure. Anthony R. Mclntosh,JMRI
v. MRI, WWW.BIO.NET, http://www.bio.net/bionet/mm/neur-sci/l993-October/012506.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
225. See Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186.
227. See Domeny v. Comm'r, No. 6975-08, 2010 WL 114287, at *5 (T.C. Jan. 13, 2010)
(emphasizing that Domeny's MS flare-ups were "intense and long-lasting").
228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186, § 47 cmt. b (explaining that an
actor who negligently causes physical harm via an emotional disturbance could be liable for
physical harm).
229. Domeny, 2010 WL 114287, at *5.
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 186, § 4 cmt. b.
231. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). This comports with the conclusion
in Murphy as well. See supra Part I.D.
232. See supra Part I.C.2.
233. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Mich. App. 2008).
234. See Leeper, supra note 29, at 1046.
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legislative history describing the reasons for the 1996 amendment, and the
historical reasons for excluding physical injury or sickness from the definition
of gross income.
There is no logical basis in law or medicine to conclude that lung cancer
caused by asbestos exposure, or an MS flareup caused by a stressful work
environment, is a physical injury or sickness that is in conformity with
Congress's intent under § 104(a)(2), but that brain sicknesses like chronic
major depression and PTSD are nonphysical injuries or symptoms of
emotional distress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Assuming Allen receives his damage award, his award should be excluded
from taxation under § 104(a)(2) because "[e]ach element of [his claim]
satisfies the requirements": objectively identified bodily injury, damages paid
"on account of' that bodily injury, and a causal link between the accident and
235the bodily injury. And while he might have suffered anxiety and other
emotional disturbances, the physical changes in his brain precipitated the
anxiety and emotional disturbance; it was not stress or anxiety that manifested
itself via headaches, insomnia, or other temporary nuisances.
Although physical injury or sickness and emotional distress under
§ 104(a)(2) are not defined by the statute, the regulations, or case law, a
workable definition of and distinction between both is available based on the
statute's legislative history, the IRS letter rulings, the draft Restatement (Third)
of Torts, and medical science. Brain-based illnesses like Allen's are physical
sicknesses or injuries. These injuries or sicknesses are not part of the group of
emotional-distress symptoms such as headaches, insomnia, or stomach
disorders; they are characteristically different. Objective evidence of the
illness provides a basis for determining that an impairment to the body has
occurred. Consequently, damages paid "because of' these sicknesses should
be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) .236
235. Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995), superseded by statute, Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
236. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996).
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